THE BOOK
Tolerance is not a license for power
FEATURED BOOK
State power often grows with a promise: to solve a problem, protect people, or make life better. But good intentions do not make coercion morally legitimate
A Theory of Minimal Tolerance asks a more difficult question: when, if ever, may that coercion be tolerated? Starting from the presumption of liberty, it sets a demanding standard for exceptions and explores how powers granted to solve particular problems can outlive them, expand, and gradually crowd out voluntary alternatives
ABSTRACT
A Theory of Minimal Tolerance asks when political coercion may be tolerated without treating it as morally legitimate. Voluntary cooperation remains the rule; coercion is an exception that must be justified
The Presumption of Liberty places the burden of proof on those proposing coercion. The Minimal Tolerance Theorem requires three conditions together: effective non-excludability, relevant non-rivalry, and persistent collapse of voluntary provision. Even when these hold, no particular intervention is automatically authorized
A second test separates state responsibility from direct state production. The book then examines how productive resilience can accommodate growing burdens, why the State cannot reliably limit itself, and how intervention may weaken voluntary alternatives. It also considers what an institutionally constrained order would require
A CRITERION, NOT A LIST
| State | Anarcho-capitalism | Minarchism | Minimal Tolerance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coercion | Morally illegitimate | Justified to protect rights | Not legitimized; only tolerated |
| Existence | Rejects it | Minimal State | Institution of last resort |
| Functions | None; all voluntary | Defense, security, and justice | Each function must meet NE, NR, and CV |
KEY CONCEPTS
The book follows three questions: which functions may enter state responsibility, when direct state production can be justified, and what happens once political power exists
THE FIRST FILTER
A function can be considered for a coercive exception only when effective non-excludability, relevant non-rivalry, and persistent collapse of voluntary provision are all established. Passing the test does not authorize a particular intervention
Voluntary cooperation is the default. Those seeking to restrict it must justify the exception; individuals need not justify their freedom
A social problem alone does not justify state intervention. Those proposing coercion must show that their response improves on available alternatives
Stable ways to sustain a function without coercion, including markets, contracts, cooperatives, mutual arrangements, charities, associations, and community organizations
Free riding or the absence of a current solution is not proof of failure. Voluntary provision must persistently fail after genuine alternatives have had a chance to develop
The State enters consideration only as a last resort. If voluntary institutions or new technologies later sustain the function, the grounds for the exception disappear
THE SECOND FILTER
Responsibility for guaranteeing a function does not require the State to produce it directly. Direct state production faces a second burden of proof
Guaranteeing a function and producing it are different decisions. Execution can occur outside government while state responsibility and the guarantee remain intact
The test is sequential: inseparable sovereign authority creates a presumption of state execution. Beyond that core, external producers take priority when performance can be verified and the producer replaced without jeopardizing the function
The first filter limits which functions may become state responsibilities. The second limits how much of their production must remain inside the State
THE CONSEQUENCES
A productive society may absorb an additional state burden and keep functioning. That adaptation makes the burden part of the inherited baseline and can make further burdens appear feasible. It facilitates expansion without making it inevitable
The more resilient a society, the more burdens it may absorb before visible distress appears. Its strength can therefore make further demands seem sustainable
Voluntary alternatives need time, experience, and resources to develop. If prolonged state control prevents them from maturing, their absence is not proof that they could never work
An exceptional power creates interests, procedures, and structures that make reversal increasingly costly. Temporary measures can outlive the circumstances that originally justified them
The institutions that create, interpret, and enforce limits on state power are part of the power being restrained. Written rules alone cannot guarantee durable restraint
Coercion often presents itself as help: taxes as solidarity, restrictions as protection, surveillance as security. Promised benefits can obscure the coercive means
Intervention can weaken the voluntary capacities whose absence later becomes its justification. Dependence may be partly created by the institution meant to relieve it
A constitution cannot enforce itself. Its limits endure only while those capable of violating them choose not to. Long obedience can hide how much institutions depend on human restraint
THE STANDARD
The burden of proof belongs to power
First when power seeks to enter. Again when it seeks to produce
THE PAPERS
Explore the research papers behind the book’s criteria, arguments, and institutional implications
Explore the Papers