Effective non-excludability
Access cannot be effectively conditioned on contribution: non-contributors continue to receive the relevant benefit
THE FORMAL CRITERION
The Theorem of Minimal Tolerance
The State is an institutional technology of last resort
INSTITUTIONAL LAST RESORT
Defining the exception
Political authority cannot presume moral legitimacy or institutional superiority. The existence of a problem, collective benefit, or market failure does not by itself justify replacing voluntary cooperation with coercion
Any possible tolerance therefore remains exceptional. The burden lies with those proposing coercion, and the theorem defines the conditions a function must satisfy to pass the test of coercive necessity
THE THEOREM OF MINIMAL TOLERANCE
Formal statement
A function passes the Minimal Tolerance Criterion only when effective non-excludability, relevant non-rivalry, and persistent collapse of voluntary provision are jointly established. This does not by itself justify any particular coercive arrangement
THE CRITERION
Two economic conditions
One institutional test
Relevant non-rivalry
Use of the relevant benefit must not meaningfully reduce what remains available to others
Persistent collapse of voluntary provision
The incentive to benefit without contributing must undermine the financing, coordination, or participation needed to sustain the function over time
COROLLARY
The burden remains with coercion
Importance, collective benefit, underprovision, or the presence of free riders cannot establish the necessity of coercion.If any one of the three conditions fails, the public-goods case for coercive necessity ends there
APPLICATIONS
Testing the boundary
The theorem distinguishes persistent failure caused by free-rider incentives from political convenience, paternalism, and dissatisfaction with voluntary outcomes