Territorial defense
Territorial defense can satisfy non-excludability and non-rivalry. It passes the test only if free-rider incentives persistently undermine the financing, coordination, or participation needed to sustain the collective function
CASES
Every exception must prove itself
THE MINIMAL TOLERANCE THEOREM
THE STRONGEST CANDIDATES
Territorial defense can satisfy non-excludability and non-rivalry. It passes the test only if free-rider incentives persistently undermine the financing, coordination, or participation needed to sustain the collective function
Some functions of collective security and legal order can satisfy the first two conditions. The remaining burden is to establish that voluntary provision persistently fails to sustain the relevant function
Exceptional emergencies can create functions whose benefits are difficult to exclude and broadly shared. They pass only where persistent voluntary collapse is also established for the specific function under examination
OUTSIDE THE EXCEPTION
These goods may be essential and socially valuable, but their importance does not remove rivalry or make exclusion ineffective. They therefore fail before persistent voluntary collapse becomes relevant
Restrictions on wages, contracts, benefits, and working conditions may pursue distributive or paternalistic goals, but those grounds do not establish the three conditions required by the theorem
Political influence, unequal bargaining power, concentration, and undesirable conduct may raise serious concerns. They do not by themselves establish effective non-excludability, relevant non-rivalry, and persistent collapse of voluntary provision
BORDERLINE CASES
Toll roads and private streets can permit effective exclusion, while some open networks may not. Congestion, technology, ownership, scale, and alternative financing arrangements can change the result
Knowledge can be difficult to exclude and can often be used without diminishing what remains for others. The remaining question is whether free-rider incentives prevent voluntary institutions from sustaining the relevant research function over time
Some urban services, such as open street lighting or other broadly shared local networks, may satisfy the first two conditions where exclusion is impracticable. The remaining question is whether voluntary provision can sustain the relevant function in a stable way
THE RESULT
The theorem does not accept or reject the State as a whole. Each function is evaluated independently, and passing one creates no presumption in favor of another
Any tolerance remains contingent on the conditions that supported it. Changes in technology, institutions, or voluntary provision can therefore require the exception to be examined again
THE BOOK
The book puts the theorem to the test across many more cases, including those where the exception seems most plausible and its limits hardest to draw